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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
DEAN E. CONDER,

Plaintiff,

vs.
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a body corporate and politic and WILLIAM J.
O'CONNOR, WARD C. HOLBROOK, CLARENCE BAMBERGER, ADAMS. BENNION, HEBER
BENNION, ALBERT R. BOWEN,
WALTER E. COSGRIFF, LeROY H.
COX, REED C. CULP, SPENCE S.
ECCLES, RICHARD L. EVANS,
MRS. ]. L. GIBSON, FULLMER H.
LATTER, ORRICE C. McSHANE,
and A. RAY OLPIN, acting as the
BOARD OF REGENTS of said University,
Defendants,

DEFE~~TS'

Case No. 7863

BRIEF

PREFATORY STATEMENT
This is an original action commenced in this court by
plaintiff to restrain the University of Utah, a body politic and
5
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corporate, and its Board of Regents from proceeding further
in a proposed issuance of University of Utah Dormitory Revenue Bonds in the principal amount of $1,000,000 pursuant
to a Loan Agreement with the United States of America,
Housing and Home Finance Agency. It is before the Court on
defendants' motion to dismiss the alternative writ of prohibition because the petition fails to state a claim against the
defendants upon which relief can be granted. The questions
to be decided are: (a) Will a pledge of the university's land
grant interest violate Utah's "restricted special fund theory"?;
(b) Can land grant interest be used to defray the cost of constructing buildings?; (c) Does the Board of Regents as pres
ently constituted have the power to authorize the issuance,
execution and delivery of said bonds?
STATEMENT OF POINTS
This brief is directed to five points:
I. THE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE BOND

ISSUE CONTEMPLATED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF
UTAH AND THAT PROPOSED BY OGDEN CITY IN
FJELDSTED V. OGDEN CITY, 83 UTAH 278, 28 P.(2D)
144, MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THE UNIVERSITY'S CASE OUT FROM UNDER THE "RESTRICTED
SPECIAL FUND THEORY" ADOPTED IN THE FJELDSTED CASE.
II. THE LANGUAGE OF THE COURT IN STATE V.
CANDLAND, 36 UTAH 406, 104. PAC. 285, WHICH
SEEMINGLY BRINGS THE BOND ISSUE NOW CON·
6
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TEMPLATED BY THE UNIVERSITY SQUARELY WITHIN THE PROHIBITION OF THE "RESTRICTED SPECIAL
FUND THEORY'' IS PURE DICTA AND NOT BINDING
UPON THE PRESENT COURT.
III. THE "RESTRICTED SPECIAL FUND THEORY"
ADOPTED IN THE FJELDSTED CASE SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED AND REPUDIATED AS CONTRA TO THE
OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AND
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE BEST REASONING.
IV. THE UNIVERSITY'S LAND-GRANT INTEREST
MAY LAWFULLY BE USED FOR THE ERECTION OF
BUILDINGS.
V. THE BOARD OF REGENTS, AS THEN CONSTITUTED, HAD FULL POWER AND AUTHORITY TO
CONTRACT WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR
THE LOAN IN QUESTION.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE BOND
ISSUE CONTEMPLATED BY THE UNIVERSITY Of
UTAH AND THAT PROPOSED BY OGDEN CITY IN
FJELDSTED V. OGDEN CITY, 83 UTAH 278, 28 P.(2D)
144, MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THE UNIVERSITY'S CASE OUT FROM UNDER THE "RESTRICTED
1
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SPECIAL FUND THEORY" ADOPTED IN THE FJELDSTED CASE.
In the Fjeldsted case the bonds were to be issued by a
municipality. In the instant case the bonds are to be issued
by a constitutional corporation. A limitation on municipal
indebtedness is imposed by Sections 3 and 4, Article XIV,
Constitution of the State of Utah. There are no such constitutional· limitations on the amount of general indebtedness
the University can assume. It is not embraced in the enumerated
political agencies or subdivisions of Sections 3 and 4, Article
XIV. If the University is considered, as was the University
of Oregon in McClain v. Regents of the University et al.,
124 Ore. 629,, 265 Pac. 412, not as an independent legal entity
but merely as an administrative agency of the State, it follows
that in indebtedness of the University is an indebtedness of
the State. However, it is a well-settled principal of law,
according to an article by E. H. Foley, Jr., Director, Legal
Division, Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works,
in 4 Fordham Law Review at page 19, that a public corporation
may be created as a distinct legal entity apart from the state
creating it, the debts of which are the debts of the corporation
and not debts of the state. Quoting from the same article at
page 23,
"Another application of the principle that obligations
issued by an incorporated instrumentality of a state
are not debts of the state may be found in the line of
cases holding that bonds issued by state institutions do
not constitute indebtedness of the state. This principle
has been applied to permit the issuance of bonds by
8
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state universities in Idaho ...., , Louisiana
Minnesota
New MexiC0 50 , and Wyoming 111 , by state boards of education in Georgia sa, Montana 53 , and Virginia 54 , by
agricultural colleges in North Dakota and Oklahoma 55
and by a state normal school and a state tuberculosis
sanitorium in Montana 56 • These cases rest partly on
the ground that the bonds issued by a state institution
are debts only of the institution, and not of the state,
and partly on the ground that the bonds are payable
out of a special fund raised from sources other than
taxation. A recent case in Georgia rests its decision
solely on the first ground and a decision in Oregon
is based solely on the second ground, ss although most
of the decisions are based on both grounds indiscriminately.so"
48

,

40

,

57

en IDAHO CONST. art IV, § 18; State ex rei. Black v. State Board
of Ed., 33 Idaho 415, 196 Pac. 201 ( 1921).
4s La. Act. No. 145, 1876; Caldwell Bros. v. Board of Supervisors,
176 La. 825, 147 So. 5 (1933).
49 Minn. Law 1927, c. 442; Fanning v. University of Minnesota,
183 Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217 (1931).

s1. Wyo. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 21; Arnold v. Bond, 34 P.(2d) 28.
soN. M. Laws 1927, c. 47; State v. Regents, 32 N. M. 428, 258 Pac.
571 (1927). SeeN. M. Laws Spec. Sess. 1934, c. 19.
s2 Ga. Laws 1931, p. 20; State v. Regents, 175 S.E. 567 (Ga. 1934).
sa Mont. Laws Extra Sess. 1933, c. 10; State ex rei Veeder v. State
Board of Ed., 33 P. (2d) 516 (Mont. 1934); Mont. Laws 1927,
c. 94; Barbour v. State Board of Ed., 92 Mont. 321, 13 P.(2d)
225 (1932.)
s4 Va. Acts Extra Sess. 1933, c. 49; Philips v. University of
Virginia, 97 Va. 472, 34 S.E. 66 (1889).
ss N.D. Laws 1929, c. 102; State ex rei. Kaufman v. Davis, 59
N. D. 191, 229 N.W. 105 ( 1930); Okla. Laws 1931, c. 34, art. 6;
Baker v. Carter, 25 P.(2d) 747 (Oklahoma 1933).
56 Mont. Laws of Extra Sess. 1933, c. 7; State ex rei. Blume v.
State Board of Ed., 34 P. (2d) 515 (Mont. 1934); Mont. Laws

9
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Extra Sess. 1933, c. 22; State ex rei. Hawkins v. State Board of
Examiners, 35 P.(2d) 116 (Mont. 1934).
:;7

State v. Regents, 175 S.E. 567 (Ga. 1934).

~s Ore. Laws 1927, p. 364; McClain v. Regents, 124 Ore. 629, 265
Pac. 412 ( 1928).

~u Some of the decisions, based on the ground that the bonds are
payable out of a special fund, involve bonds payable, not out of
revenues derived from the undertaking financed thereby, but bonds
payable out of the ilflcome of lands granted by the Federal Government for university purposes, or the permanent school fund resulting
from the sale of such lands. State ex rei. Black v. State Board of Ed.,
33 Idaho 415, 196 Pac. 201 ( 1921); State v. Regents, 32 N. M. 428,
258 Pac. 571 (1927); Arnold v. Bond, 34 P.(2d) 28 (Wyo. 1934);
State ex rei. Blume v. State Board of Ed., 34 P. ( 2d) 515 (Mont. 1934).
Contra: State ex rei. Haire v. Rice, 33 Mont. 365, 83 Pac. 874 (1906),
aff'd, 204 U. S. 291 (·1907); State v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104
Pac. 285, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1260 (1909); Roach v. Gooding, 11
Idaho 244, 81 Pac. 642 ( 1905.) On the nature of the obligation imposed by the Federal Government, see Alabama v. Schmidt, 232
U. S. 168 ( 1914,) per Holmes, J.

The language of the Court in State v. Regents, 179 Ga.
210, 175 S.E. 567, referred to in the previous note is as follows:
··Bonds and other obligations similar to those involved
in this case and proposed by state institutions have been
considered by the courts of several states; and it
has been generally held that if the institution is a
distinct corporate entity, the resulting liabilities could
not be treated as a debt of the state within the meaning of the constitutional prohibitions or limitations
in reference to state indebtedness. Baker v. Carter, 165
Okla. 116. 25 P.(2d) 747; Fanning v. University of
Minnesota, 183 Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217; Alabama
State Bridge Corp v. Smith, 217 Ala. 3·11, 116 So. 695;
Caldwell Bros. v. Board of Supervisors, 176 La. 825,
147 So. 5; State ex rel.. Black v. State Board, 33 Idaho,
415, 196 P. 201; State v. Regents, 32 N. M. 428, 258
P. 571. One exception to this general statement is to
10
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be found in the case of McClain v. Regents, 124 Or.
629, 265 P. 412, in which it was held by the Supreme
Court of Oregon that while the Regents of the University of that state was a corporation, it was yet a
public corporation, and that any indebtedness incurred
by it would be an indebtedness of the state. Upon this
particular question that decision would seem not to be
in accord with the current of authority, unless a distinction should be made in view of the statutes of that
state."
It should be noted that Georgia applies the restricted spec-

ial fund theory to municipalities but refuses to apply it to the
university, Dortch v. Southeastern Fair Assoc., 182 Ga. 633,
186 S.E. 685.
In accord with said Georgia case is Board of Regents of
University of Arizona v. Sullivan, 45 Arizona 245, 42 P.(2d)
619.
In an action brought to test the validity of a $1,250,000
bond issue for the benefit of Louisiana State University, the
Court said in Caldwell Bros. v. Board of Supervisors, 176 La.
825, 147 So. 5:
" ( 4) Under these statutory grants, defendant board
clearly has the power to borrow money from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and, necessarily, to
issue certificates in repayment of same for the purpose
of construction of the necessary and useful buildings
in question. The board does not intend, by any means,
to pay these certificates out of its alimony from ad
valorem taxes, or any funds it may receive in the future
dedicated by law to a particular purpose, but entirely
from profits from the Athletic Association, the dormi11
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tories, the cafeterias, rentals received for the apartments at the Old University campus, matriculation fees,
etc., which, it is admitted, are adequate for the repayment of the loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
( 5) It is therefore plain that neither section 1 of Act
No. 7 of 1921 (Ex .. Sess.), nor section 15 of Act No.
145 of 1876 authorizes defendant board to contract
any debt or liability on behalf of the state, in violation
of article 4, § 2, of the present Constitution ( 1921) ."

The Board of Regents of the University of Idaho is a
constitutional corporation, the same as the University of Utah.
In a landmark case fixing the status of the University of Idaho,
State ex rel. Black v. State Board of Education et al., 33 Ida.,
415, 196 Pac. 201, the Court said:
" ( 4) It is admitted by the Attorney General, and we
think correctly so, that the proceeds of federal land
grants, direct federal appropriations, and private donations to the University are trust funds, and are not subject to the constitutional requirement that money must
be appropriated before it is paid out of the state treasury. Claims against such funds need not be passed
upon by the Board of Examiners, and the moneys in
such funds may be expended by the Board of Regents,
subject only to the conditions and limitations provided
in the acts of Congress making such grants and appropriations, or the conditions imposed by the donors
upon the donations. Melgard v. Eagleson, 31 Idaho
411, 172 Pac. 655; Evans v. Van Deusen, 31 Idaho
614, 174 Pac. 122.
If a claim against the regents is a claim against the

12
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state it must be presented to the Board of Examiners
for approval. * * *
That a claim against the regents is not a. claim against
the state is finally disposed of in First National Bank
of Moscow v. Regents, 26 Idaho 15, 140 Pac. 771,
in the following language:
"There is no merit in the contention that the district
court was without jurisdiction and that the only jurisdiction to hear this case was in the Supreme Court. * * *
The doctrine there announced (Moscow Hardware
Company v. Regents and First National Bank v. Regents, supra) is sound and consonant with the provisions of the Constitution and statute, and is affirmed
in so far as it applies to the Board of Regents of
the State lJniversity."

( 1) This necessarily follows for the reason that the
Board of Regents is a constitutional corporation with
granted powers, and while functioning within the
scope of its authority is not subject to the control or
supervision of any other branch, board or department
of the state government, but is a separate entity, and
may sue and be sued, with power to contract and discharge indebtedness, with the right to exercise its discretion within the powers granted, without authority
to contract indebtedness against the state, and in no
sense is a claim against the regents one against the
state."
As stated at the beginning of this discussion, Ogden City
in the Fjeldsted case had the power to incur a general obligation had it not been for the constitutional prohibition. Since
states are immune from suit without their consent, the University has no such power to impose a legal obligation on the

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State of Utah. At most the only obligation it can impose will
be solely moral and any bond issue of the Agricultural College
or the University of Utah, under Chapter 126, Laws of Utah,
1947, tends to impose such a moral obligation even if no
land grant interest is pledged to pay it.
In establishing the restriction upon the special fund
theory of the Barnes case, the Court in the Fjeldsted case
relied almost exclusively on Garrett v. Swanson, 216 Cal. 220,
13· P. (2d) 725. Without expressly overruling the Garrett
case, the California Court in Department of Water and Power
v. Vroman, 218 Cal. 206, 22 P.(2d) 698 refused to apply
the restriction to the Department of Water and Power, an
etsablished charter department of the City of Los Angeles. In
that case, revenue from an existing electrical system worth
$86,000,000 was proposed to be pledged to secure repayment
of $22,800,000 to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
for money to be borrowed to build transmission lines from
Boulder Dam to Southern California. The Court said:
·'We attach no particular significance to the first objection, as such, viz., that the loan agreement provides
for the repayment of moneys to be borrowed by the
department out of revenues from the existing electric
system as well as from revenues for the transmission
sysetm proposed to be constructed, and that thereby
the constitutional provision is violated. If it has any
importance it is in connection with the second objection
which is to the effect that, although the moneys to be
borrowed are payable only out of the power revenue
fund, said fund may prove to be inadequate, and the
general taxpayers may in that event be required to
pay taxes to meet the sums to become due on the

14
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general bonds of the city heretofore issued for the
construction and acquisition of a municipal electric
system, thus rendering the loan agreement and the notes
to be issued pursuant thereto without the scope of the
special fund doctrine to which this state is committed.
See Shelton v. City of Los Angeles, 206 Cal. 544, 275
P. 421; In re California Toll Bridge Authority (City
and County of San Francisco v. Wentworth), 212 Cal.
298, 298 P. 485; California Toll Bridge v. Kelly (Cal.
Sup.) 21 P. (2d) 425. It would seem that the Shelton
Case alone had placed the revenue funds under the
control of the board definitely in the category of special
funds, the obligations against which are not responsive to section 18 of article 11 of the Constitution; but
it is insisted that this court in Garrett v. Swanton, 216
Cal. 220, 13 P.(2d) 725, has so limited the special fund
doctrines as to exclude the present case from its application. To this we cannot agree, and the cases are
readily distinguishable. In Garrett v. Swanson the
contracting party was the city, a governmental entity
held directly submissive to the constitutional mandate.
Here the contracting party, in so far as concerns the
incurring of the indebtedness or liability, is not the city
of Los Angeles, as a municipal corporation, but is an
independent municipal agency not controlled by the
constitutional provision."
As recently as December 7, 1951, the Second District
Court of Appeals in California in the City of Glendale v.
Chapman, 238 P.(2d) 162 again refused to apply the restricted
special fund theory where revenue from a $7,630,355.52
existing water-works system was pledged to pay 210 revenue
bonds of the par value of $100,000 each. The Court said:
" ( 4) The amici curiae who appear in support of
respondents contend that, although the moneys to be

15
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received from the sale of the bonds are payable only
out of the net earnings of the waterworks, should that
fund prove to be inadequate, the general fund will
be invaded and the taxpayer be required to pay the sums
due on the bonds. In reason how could such claim be
made? In Shelton v. City of Los Angeles, 206 Cal.
544, at page 551, 275 P. 421, at page 424, Mr. Justice
Shenk says this obligation "is not a financial one, in
default of which the city would be required to disburse the general funds of the city or other moneys
derived from taxation." By the ordinance the revenue
funds are set aside as a special fund whose obligations
are not responsive to section 18 of Article XI. Department of Water and Power v. Vroman, supra, 218 Cal.
at page 219, 22 P. 2d 698; Shelton v. City of Los
Angeles, supra; California Toll Bridge Authority v.
Kelly, 218 Cal. 7, 21 P. (2d) 425.
( 5) The marking of a fund for a special purpose
by a municipality has given rise to the Special Fund
doctrine to which the jurisprudence of this state is
committed. Amici curiae contend that such doctrine
has been so limited by Garrett v. Swanton, 216 Cal.
220, 13 P.(2d) 725, as to render it worthless as support
for petitioner. In Department of Water and Power
v. Vroman Justice Shenk pointed out that in Garrett
v. Swanton the contracting party was the city "directly
submissive to the constitutional mandate," (218 Cal.
206, 22 P.(2d) 704) and in California Toll Bridge
Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. at page 14, 21 P.(2d)
at page 427, the same learned justice suggests that in
the Garrett case ·'The bonds were city bonds, and were
not payable solely from the special fund created by
segregation of the revenues for that purpose, but also
from the general fund of the city in the event the
special fund should be insufficient." The law governing the operation and disposition of a special fund
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such as that established as the "Waterworks Revenue
Bonds, Reserve Fund" is declared (ibidem) by Justice
Shenk in the following: "These funds are special funds,
and obligations payable solely from such funds do
not constitute a debt within the meaning of the constitutional limitation involved." See Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S. C. 288, 301, 135 S.E. 153; Wright
v. Hardwick, 152 Ga. 302, 109 S. E. 903; Alabama
State Bridge Corporation v. Smith, 217 Ala. 3·11, 116
So. 695. That subordinate municipal boards may contract for payment of moneys from their special funds
and that such contracts are not violative of section
18 of Article XI of the constitution was, upon an extensive review of the authorities of other jurisdictions,
declared to be the law of this state in Shelton v. City
of Los Angeles. The contract of a city for the payment of money out of a special fund, such as is involved
herein, may impose a strong moral obligation to approve a schedule of rates to discharge the principal
and interest of the indebtedness as it becomes due.
Such obligation is not of a financial character in default of which the city would be required to disburse
its general funds derived from taxation."
California seems to have receded from its former position
restricting the application of the special fund doctrine.
Certainly the imposition of a moral obligation, which is
all that could be imposed upon the state in the instant case,
is no longer a deterrent there.
Section 2, Chapter 126, Laws of Utah, 1947, expressly says
that income from remodeled existing buildings may be pledged
to secure such a loan as is contemplated in instant case as well
as income and revenues from sources other than legislative
appropriations.
17
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POINT NO. II
THE LANGUAGE OF THE COURT IN STATE V.
CANDLAND, 36 UTAH 406, 104. PAC. 285, WHICH
SEEMINGLY BRINGS THE BOND ISSUE NOW CONTEMPLATED BY THE UNIVERSITY SQUARELY WITHIN THE PROHIBITION OF THE "RESTRICTED SPECIAL
FUND THEORY" IS PURE DICTA AND NOT BINDING
UPON THE PRESENT COURT.
In State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland et al., 36
Utah 406, 104 Pac. 285, Justice Frick, speaking for the Court,
noted:
"According to the last biennial report of the board
of regents of the University of Utah to the governor,
and of which we are authorized to take judicial notice,
the estimated income from the proceeds of all land
sales now amounts to $22,000 annually, or to $44,000
for the years 1909 and 1910. The estimated income
from all other sources, not including appropriations
from the state for the years aforesaid, amounts to
$28,000 more. The total estimated income from all
sources, not including appropriations from state moneys
raised by taxation, for the next two years is, therefore,
$72,000, while the expenses of conducting and maintaining the university alone, not including the other
schools and institutions connected with it, for the next
two years, were estimated at $318,000."
and then went on to say:
"Every dollar in excess of $72,000 derived from other
sources must, therefore, be raised by a tax levied upon
all the taxable property within the state, and must
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be paid out of the state treasury. We mention this simply
because it is clear that it would not change the result
even though a portion of the $72,000 were appropriated and set aside for the payment of the principal
and interest of the obligation in question. If the amount
necessary to pay principal and interest were in fact
taken from the income of the university, it would
simply result in requiring the state to supply the
amount so taken from its general fund for "general
maintenance,'' and hence nothing would be gained, ~o
far as the taxpayer is concerned, by making the obligation payable out of the income before referred to."
Those remarks of the Court were pure dicta. The legislative
act before the Court authorized a loan of all, or a part of, the
corpus of the landgrant fund and obligated the state to pay
interest on the same from the state's general fund. Obviously,
the act in question was unconstitutional.
The dicta enunciated a restricted special fund rule for
a state case on the theory that a pledge of land-grant interest
will tend to impose a moral obligaton on the state to enhance
its appropriations to the university.
But a statute in Montana providing for the erection of
state normal school buildings and for financing thereof by
issuance of bonds and pledging earnings of the school plus
one-half the income from the land-grant funds to pay for
same was held not to be unconstitutional in State ex rei.
Blume v. State Board of Education of Montana et al., 97
Mont. 371, 34 P. ( 2d) 515, citing prior Montana cases. Likewise a statute in New Mexico authorizing the pledging of
land-grant interest was held not to be unconstitutional in the
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State v. Regents of the University of New Mexico, 32 N.M.
428, 258 Pac. 571.
In Arnold et al v. Bond, 47 Wyo. 236, 34 P.(2d) 28,
brought to test the constitutionality of a Wyoming statute
authorizing the University to pledge land-grant interest to
secure a loan, the Court said:
" ( 3) 2. Article 16 of the Constitution contains provisions for the limitation of indebtedness. Section 1
thereof provides: 'The state of Wyoming shall not,
in any manner, create any indebtedness exceeding one
per centum on the assessed value of the taxable· property in the state, as shown by the last general assessment for taxation, preceding; except to suppress insurrection or to provide for the public defense.'
Section 2 thereof provides: 'No debt in excess of the
taxes for the current year, shall in any manner be
created in the state of Wyoming, unless the proposition to create such debt shall have been submitted to a
vote of the people and by them approved; except to
suppress insurrection or to provide for the public
defense.'
The question is whether either of these sections are
violated by the legislation act in question and by the
proposed loan. There is no such violation, of course,
if the indebtedness is not a state debt, or if, by reason
of the repayments to be made only out of the income
of the University fund, liability thereon is limited
so as not to be a charge on the taxpayers of the state.
In the case of State ex rel. v. McMillan, 12 N. D.
280, 96 N.W. 310, bonds issued by the trustees of a
normal school were held invalid as being an obliga. tion of the state .The law in question in that case
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provided that the interest should be paid out of the
income from lands granted to the state for normal
school purposes, and that, if such income should
prove to be insufficient, the remainder should be paid
out of the general fund of the state. In the case of
State ex rel. v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 P. 285,
24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1260, 140 Am. St. Rep. 834, bonds
issued for the erection of buildings at the Utah University were held invalid. The land board was authorized under the law to take $250,000 from the principal
of the University fund and loan it to the University
board. The income from the fund was, under the law,
to be turned over to the board as usual, and the principal and interest on the loan was directed to be paid
out of any money in the hands of the board or appropriated for its use. It was held that the loan was an
indebtedness of the state, and that the effect of the
payments of principal and interest on the loan in the
manner specified by the law meant merely that the
taxpayers of the state would be compelled to make
up that amount in some other way. The legislative
act in the case at bar does not contain the specific
and objectionable features above mentioned. The
majority of courts have held that an obligation similar
to that involved in the case at bar is not a debt of the
state. State ex rel. Bickford v. Cook, 17 Mont. 529,
43 P. 928; Stein v. Morrison, 9 Idaho 426, 75 P. 246;
Lewis v. Brady, 17 Idaho 251, 104 P. 900, 28 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 152; State ex rel. v. Collins, 21 Mont. 448,
53 P. 1114; Barbour v. State Board, 92 Mont. 321,
13 P.(2d) 225; State ex rel. v. Regents, 32 N. M.
428, 258 P. 571; State ex rel. v. Clausen, 134 Wash.
196, 235 P. 364, 366; Allen v. Grimes, 9 Wash. 424,
3·7 P. 662; Fanning v. University of Minnesota, 183
Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217; Caldwell v. Board, 176
La. 825, 147 So. 5. In McClain v. Regents, 124 Ore.
629, 265 P. 412, the court held that, while the ob-
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ligation involved in that case, which was similar to
that involved in th case at bar, was that of the state,
it did not violate the constitutional provisions relating to limitation of indebtedness, in view of the fact
that it could be paid only out of a particular fund.
In the case of State ex rel. v. Clausen, supra, it appears that the Legislature authorized the issuance
of bonds for the purpose of erecting a capitol building,
the bonds, both principal and interest, to be paid
only out of revenues derived from the grant of lands
for capitol building purposes. The validity of the
bonds was upheld. Holding that they did not create
an indebtedness of the state, the court said: "The
legislative act under discussion expressly provides that
the princicpal and interest of the bonds authorized
shall be payable only from revenues hereafter received
from the lease and sale of the granted lands. In no
possible way is the credit of the state involved. Not
one dollar of its general property can be used to discharge those bonds or the interest on them. Not one
dollar of taxes can be put to that purpose. * * * Its
(the state's) only obligation under this act is to see
that all the revenues hereafter received from the lease
or sale of the granted lands shall be applied towards
the payment of these bonds and their interest. On no
principle of law can it be said that under these circumstances any debt has been contracted 'by or on
behalf of this state.' "
The Court then distinguishes Rodman v. Munson,
13 Barb. (N.Y.) 63, and Newell v. People, 7 N.Y.
63, where bonds issued, to be paid out of a particular
fund, were held to create a debt of the state, and proceeds to say: 'There the revenues pledged came from
the operation of canals owned by the state in its propriety capacity. Its reveneus when collected belonged
to the state, and might be applied towards the dis-
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charge of any of its general obligations. Any amount
of the funds so arising, which must go to the discharge
of the ceitificates which were sought to be issued, would
have been made up by taxation of the property within
the state or of its people in some form of other. The
situation here is very different. These granted lands
do not belong to the state in the ordinary sense, and
any moneys coming from them can be used only for
the purpose of constructing capitol buildings. To us
the distinction between those cases and this one is
very clear.'
In the case of State v. Regents of University, 32 N.M.
428, 259 P. 571, 572, the regents were sought to be

enjoined from issuing bonds or building purposes,
payable only out of the income of the University land
fund. The court said: 'The Attorney General argues
that the proposed bonds are in effect the obligation
of the state, and as such may be issued only in compliance with the provisions of section 8 of article 9 of
the Constitution, which requires that any law authorizing any such debt shall provide for an annual tax
levy sufficient to pay interest and provide a sinking
fund, and each law shall be submitted to a vote of the
people for approval, neither of which requirements
have been complied with. The argument is unsound
and based upon a false premise. * * * It (the University) proposes to contract with its bondholders
that it will appropriate out of its income sufficient
sums of money to pay interest and provide a sinking
fund for the retirement of the bonds. It does not propose to mortgage its property in specie. It simply
agrees to pay out of its income. How it can be said
that this will be an obligation of the state, we cannot
understand. This is simply a contract of the University to pay out of a designated fund when received.
It is no more an obligation of the state than would
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be the obligation to pay the salaries of the University
faculty. The mere fact that the University is a creature
of the state and one of its instrumentalities to carry
out its governmental functions is not controlling. The
state has given the University certain property rights
and has authorized it to make use of the same in a
certain manner. This the University is proposing to
do, and we can see no objection to the same.'
We are inclined to agree with the opinion of the
majority of the courts. The legislative act in question
here specifically provides that only the income from
the University land fund, and not the general credit
of the state or any property whatsoever except such
income, shall be obligated under the loan. We do
not see why we should not give this language its
natural meaning, on construe the act as creating a
greater obligation, moral or otherwise, than it purports to create, when the terms thereof are clearly
known before the proposed loan is made. The argument that the taxpayers of the state will be compelled
to make up the principal and interest paid out on
the loan has, of course,force from a practical standpoint and cannot be overlooked. Theoretically, the
Legislature may, or may not, appropriate out of the
general funds or otherwise the amount so to be paid.
It is not theoretically compelled to do so. Of course,
if the proposed loan were of such amount that as a
result of it the Legislature would practically be compelled to make up the payments under the loan by
taxation in order that the University might be able to
function as such in a reasonable way, a different question would arise, and we should probably not be warranted in that case to waive aside the objection here
discussed merely because of the theoretical side of
the question. But, as will be shown in another connection, the loan is not of that amount.''
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POINT NO. III
THE "RESTRICTED SPECIAL FUND THEORY"
ADOPTED IN THE FJELDSTED CASE SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED AND REPUDIATED AS CONTRA TO THE
OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AND
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE BEST REASONING.
The restricted special fund theory was first established
by City of Joliet v. Alexander (1902) 194 Ill. 457, 62 N.E.
861. It was later repudiated at the place of its birth, Ward
v. City of Chicago (1930) 342 Ill. 167, 173 N.E. 810; Maffitt
v. City of Decatur ( 1926) 3;.2 Ill. 82, 152 N.E. 602. Missouri
adhered to the theory in Bell v. City of Fayette (1930) 325
Mo. 75, 28 S.W. (2d) 356, and repudiated it in Grossman v.
Public Water Supply District No. 1 (1936) 339 Mo. 344,
96 S.W. (2d) 701. _The apparent retreat of the California
Court was discussed under Point No. 1.
Jurisdictions which have specifically considered and rejected the restricted special fund theory are: Arizona: Guthrie
v. City of Mesa (1936) 47 Ariz. 336, 56 P.(2d) 655; California: Department of Water and Power (1933) 218 Cal. 206,
22 P.(2d) 698; City of Glendale v. Chapman (1951) 238
P. (2d) 162; Colorado: Searle v. Haxtun ( 1928) 84 Colo.
494, 271 Pac. 629; Florida: State v. Miami (193·3) 113 Fla.
280, 152 So. 6; Boykin v. River Junction (1936) 124 Fla.
827, 169 So. 492; Indiana: Underwood v. Fairbanks, Morse
&Co. (1933) 205 Ind. 316,185 N.E. 118; Kentucky: Bowling
Green v. Kirby ( 1927) 220 Ky. 839, 295 S.W. 1004; Security .
Trust v. Paris (1936) 264 Ky. 846, 95 S.W. (2d) 781; Minne25
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sota: Struble v. Nelson (1944) 217 Minn. 610, 15 N.W.
(2d) 101; Missouri: Grossman v. Public Water Supply District
( 1936) 339 Mo. 344, 96 S. W. (2d) 701; Montana: State
ex rel. Blume v. State Board of Education (1934) 97 Mont.
371, 34 P.(2d) 515; New Mexico: Seward v. Bowers (1933)
37 N.M. 385, 24 P.(2d) 253; North Dakota: Stark v. City
of Jamestown (1949) 37 N.W. (2d) 516; South Carolina:
Cathcart v. Columbia ( 1933) 170 S. C. 362, 170 S. E. 435;
Wyoming: Laverents v. City of Cheyenne (1950) 217 P. (2d)
877.

In addition to the foregoing authorities, a valuable note
in 37 Columbia Law Review at page 210 lists the following
jurisdictions as having disregarded the restricted special fund
theory without express consideration of it: Arkansas; Iowa;
Nebraska; New York; Oregon; Texas; Washington.
The jurisdictions still adhering to the theory, besides
Utah, are: South Dakota: Hesse v. City of Watertown (1930)
57 S.D. 325, 232 N.W. 53, distinguished, however, in Robbins
v. City of Rapid City, (S. D. 1946) 23 N. W. (2d) 144;
Georgia: Dortch v. Southeastern Fair Association ( 1936) 182
Ga. 633, 186 S. E. 685; Ohio: State ex rel. Public Institutional
Building v. Griffith (1939) 135 0. St. 604, 22 N. E. (2d) 200.
The cases in Alabama, Oklahoma and Wisconsin, cited
in 37 Col. L. Review at page 210, seemingly in support of
the theory can be distinguished on their facts.
The overwhelming weight of authority is opposed to the
restriction. The authorities are collected in 72 A.L.R. 687;
96 A.L.R. 1385; 146 A.L.R. 328.
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Theoretically, the restricted special fund theory is unsound
when applied to a state case. Constitutional limitations on indebtedness have reference to obligations which must be paid
from tax levies. A purely moral obligation does not have to
be paid from a tax levy. Trust funds donated to the university
should not in justice relieve the state of its obligation to support the institution. The expenditure of such trust funds
should, therefore, neither impose or enhance the obligations
resting upon the taxpayers. At most all the taxpayer loses
is a subsidy he was not entitled to have in the first place.
Grossman v. Public Water Supply District No. 1 (1936) 339
Mo. 344, 96 S. W. (2d) 701.

POINT NO.4
THE UNIVERSITY'S LAND-GRANT INTEREST
MAY LAWFULLY BE USED FOR THE ERECTION OF
BUILDINGS.
The land-grants to the University from the federal government are contained in Sections 8 and 12 of the Enabling
Act. Since the grants in Section 12 are for the establishment
and maintenance of a School of Mines and State Normal Schools
it is s~lf -evident that none of the interest from those grants can
be utilized to construct a dormitory.
It will be noted that the grants under Section 8, authorized
by the Act of February 21, 1855, to be reserved for the
establishment of the University of Utah, are granted to the
State of Utah for university purposes * * * and the income
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thereof to be used exclusively for the purposes of such university
* * * . Section 5, Art. X of the Constitution of the State of
Utah says that the proceeds of the sale of said lands shall
be safely invested and the income thereof be used exclusively
for the support and maintenan~e of the university rrin accordance with the requirements and conditions ofsaid Acts of Congress."
Roach v. Gooding, 11 Ida. 244, 81 Pac. 642, construing
Section 5 of the Idaho Admission Bill (corresponding to Section 10 of the Enabling Act of the State of Utah) held that
it modified Section 8 of said Admission Bill (corresponding
to Section 8 of the Enabling Act of the State of Utah) and
that consequently .income from university lands could not be
used to construct a domestic science building, said income being
restricted to current expense purposes.- State ex rel. Blume v.
State Board of Education, 97 Mont. 371, 34 P. (2d) 515,
distinguishing the Roach case, and refusing to admit that the
Enabling Act provision of Montana, corresponding to Utah's
Section 10, affected Montana's provision corresponding to
Utah's Section 8, had no difficulty in allowing the income
from university lands to be used for building purposes. Justice
Frick in State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland, 36 U.
at page 421 said:
'·In view of the express provtstons of Section 8,
supra, relating to the University of Utah, we assume
that the general provisions contained in Section 10
just referred to were not intended to apply to the
proceeds derived from the sale of lands granted for
university purposes, and we shall proceed upon such
an assumption."
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A men's dormitory certainly is for a university purpose as
contemplated by Section 8 of our Enabling Act and since the
phrase "for the support and maintenance" in Section 5, Art.
X of the Constitution of the State of Utah is modified by the
further provision "in accordance with the requirements and
conditions of said Acts of Congress" no argument can be
made that the interest from the university lands must be used
solely for current expenses. However, in Arnold v. Bond,
(Wyo. 1934) the court held that even the word "support"
construed broadly would permit the erection of buildings.
See also Merrill v. Spencer, 14 U. 273, 46 Pac. 1096.

POINT NO.5
THE BOARD OF REGENTS, AS THEN CONSTITUTED, HAD FULL POWER AND AUTHORITY TO
CONTRACT WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR
THE LOAN IN QUESTION.
Admitting for the sake of argument, that Section 4, Art.
X of the Constitution of the State of Utah "froze" the constituency of the Board of Regents beyond legislative amendment so that the Board as now constituted is not composed of
de jure officers, nevertheless it is composed of de facto officers
actually engaged in conducting the affairs of the institution.
In Smith v. Town of Carolina Beach, 206 N.C. 834, 175 S.E.
313, an attempt was made to restrain a bond issue by town
officers admittedly only de facto officials. Held that the authority of the de facto officials could not be questioned except in
a direct proceedings. And a case note in III Geo. Wash. Law
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Review 265 commenting on the holding concurs in the opinion
that the acts of a de facto official "whether completed or past,
or contemplated for the future, should be subject to attack only
by the state in a direct proceedings."
The status of the Board of Trustees of the Utah State
Agricultural College was questioned in the recent case of
Spence v. Utah State Agricultural, 225 P. (2d) 18. It was held
that the Board "is legally constituted."
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,

Attorney General
ALLEN B. SORENSEN,

Assistant Attorney General
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